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NATIONAL-STATE COOPERATION- ITS PRESENT
POSSIBILITIES*
EDWARD S. CORVWINi
IN AN admirable article commenting upon certain recent decisions of
the Supreme Court, Professor Bunn has remarked:
"Effective governmental power to regulate the main strategic
factors of 'ordinary private business' is non-existent in this country.
To those who think that everywhere and always an unregulated
economy is best, that business decisions are necessarily more wise
and beneficial to the public if made by business people rather than
politicians,, the situation must be highly satisfactory. To those who
disagree, who think that government must interfere before the oil
is gone and the soil blown away into the ocean, and that at other
points our economic life now or hereafter may need major regulation
at the hands of government, the present status is a nightmare. For
'when power is lackifig the wisest statesmen in the world are inef-
fective. The question is, what shall we do about it?"'
Professor Bunn thereupon proceeds to answer his own question thus:
"Within the Constitution, two main methods are proposed: interstate
compacts and a Constitutional amendment" The former alternative he
rejects outright, for the following cogent reasons:
"1. Where the states concerned are scattered or their interests
diverse, agreement is unlikely. In Congress a majority governs, to
make a compact requires unanimity.
"2. Where the states concerned are near together and their in-
terests united, there is danger of action for sectional rather than
national welfare. Congress has a veto, but it has no affirmative au-
thority, and it can hardly be expected to be as alert to the national
interests as it should be where it initiates action itself.
"3. A compact once made is a contract-it is as hard to amend
it as to make it in the first place.
"4. States cannot by compact acquire powers which the Con-
stitution denies them. Th Fourteenth Amendment and the com-
merce clause will continue to control state action however much the
states may contract to the contrary.
"Compacts are -clearly therefore not the main solution."2
*This is the first of a series of articles looking to a re-e.,amination of the history
of the National Constitution in the year of its one hundred and fiftieth annivemary as
a document, and as an instrument of government its one hundred and forty-eighth.
IProfessor of Jurisprudence, Princeton University.
1. Bunn, Production, Prices, Income and the Constlutlion (1936) 11 Vs. L.
R-v. 313.
2. Id. at 320-21.
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Mr. Bunn then turns to the amendment method as the single remaining
possibility. But this, too, I contend, is open to strong objections when the
underlying reasons for the present situation are thoroughly explored. As I
have elsewhere put the matter:
"Most, if not all, of the principal New Deal legislation might have
been sustained had the Court chosen to give the doctrines invoked
against it as liberal an application as it has sometimes done in the
past; or if it had simply chosen to give the words of the Constitution
itself their logical and historical meanings.
"But if this is so, what would be the point in adding 'new' powers
to Congress by Constitutional amendment? And more especially,
what would be the point in doing so if these powers were to be ex-
posed to the same principles of construction as made them necessary?
"How long would they, subjected to the vague, indefinite tests of
constitutionality to which the New Deal legislation succumbed, re-
main adequate to the purposes for which they were adopted?
"The further question accordingly arises, whether those who urge
Constitutional amendment as the best means of meeting the present
situation would like to see the above mentioned tests of constitution-
ality abolished? It seems not.
"'What they propose is really that the power which was originally
granted in broad terms to the National Goveriment should be re-
granted piece by piece, and that without any guaranty that the re-
grant would be more effective than the original grant has turned out
to be!
"This may not be quite the same thing as proposing that the
national legislative power be gradually transferred from Article I to
Article V of the Constitution, but it is pretty nearly that.
"The suggestion of specific Constitutional amendments as a means
of meeting the present situation may, therefor.e, be ruled out without
more ado. If the Court does not exchange its present application of
'the reserved powers of the States' concept, the 'due process of
law' concelpt, and the maxim against delegated legislation for more
liberal views, such amendments would not suffice-indeed, they might
prove a positive menace to admitted powers, on the well-known prin-
ciple of construction that a specific power argues against a more
general one.
"If, on the other hand, the Court does come around to the liberal
views on which the New. Deal legislation was justifiably predicated,
then such amendments would be unnecessary."a
In short, we must still trust the Court, as we have so largely in the
past, to correct its own errors. At the same time, however, we must
recognize that admission of error comes hard to human nature, and
especially to that indurated type of human nature which is apt to occupy
3. See New York Post, Dec. 1, 1936, p. 1, col. 2.
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high judicial office. Can we then help the Court out of its present pre-
dicament by suggesting to it a somewhat different approach to some of
the problems of constitutionality which it must solve in the near future?
To put the matter otherwise-Why should the Court be led back over
the Serbonian bog of its past mistakes if a new path can be pointed out
to it -which avoids said bog? And can that way be found in the manifold
possibilities of National-State Cooperation?
1.
The following are the salient and pertinent features of "our dual
form of government": 1. As in all federations, a union of several au-
tonomous political entities, or "states," for common purposes; 2. An
apportionment of the sum total of legislative power permissible in a free
commonwealth between a "national government," on the one hand, and
constituent "states," on the other; 3. The direct operation for the most
part of each of these centers of government, within its assigned sphere,
upon all persons and property within its territorial limits; 4. The pro-
vision of each center with the complete apparatus of law enforcement,
executive and judicial; 5. The supremacy of the "national government"
within its assigned sphere over any conflicting assertion of "state" power;
6. Dual citizenship.
The problem which I shall treat in this paper is, what species of Nation-
al-State relationship do the above "fixed data' of dual federalism admit
of? The question may, conceivably, be approached from either of two
points of view. The two governmental centers may be envisaged as
vzore or less jealous rivals for power, or they may be viewed as mutually
supplementing agencies of government. Fortunately, except for the period
immediately preceding the Civil War, when the self-defensive neces-
sities of slavery affected constitutional interpretation unduly, the latter
is the conception which has generally prevailed.
The theory of the Articles of Confederation was that the powers of
the General Government should be exercised through the state govern-
ments. The theory was not effectively realized in practice, with the result,
pointed out by Chief Justice Marshall in HcCulloc v. ilaryland, that
the government set up by the Constitution of 1787 was not, in general,
left dependent upon the states "for the execution of the great powers
assigned to it." At the same time, however, this independence was
very far from being regarded as utterly divorcing the two governmental
centers or as making state governmental machinery unavailable for
national purposes.
In point of fact, it would seem that the framers of the Constitution
looked forward to something like a mixed system of functional and
4. 4 Wheat. 316, 424 (U. S. 1319).
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dual federalism-one which would permit the gradual transference of
the greater part of the legislative power to the National Government,
while incorporating the judicial and'executive organs of the states into
the national administrative mechanism. In this connection the follow-
ing entry in the official journal of the Convention for July 17th becomes
most instructive:
"It was moved and seconded to postpone the consideration of the
second clause of the Sixth resolution reported from the Committee
of the whole House in order to take up the following:
'To make laws binding on the People of the United States in all
cases which may concern the common interests of the Union: but
not to interfere with the government of the individual States in any
matters of internal police which respect the government of such
States only, and wherein the genergl welfare of the United States
is not concerned' which passed in the negative (Ayes-2; noes-
8). It was moved and seconded to alter the second clause of the 6th
resolution so as to read as follows, namely
'and moreover to legislate in all cases for the general interests of
the Union, and also in thosle to which the States are separately in-
competent, or in which the harmony of the United States may be
interrupted by the exercise of individual legislation.'
"which passed in the affirmative (Ayes-6; noes-4) ...
"It was moved and seconded to agree to the following resolution
namely
'Resolved that the legislative acts of the United States made by
virtue and in pursuance of the articles of Union and all Treaties
made and ratified under the authority of the United States shall be
the supreme law of the respective States as far as those acts or
Treaties shall relate to the said States, or their Citizens and In-
habitants-and that the Judiciaries of the .several States shall be
bound thereby in their decisions, anything in the respective laws of
the individual States to the contrary notwithstanding.' Which passed
unanimously in the affirmative." 5
Two things here emerge: 1. That it was the intention of the Con-
vention that the legislative powers subsequently to be delegated the
National Government should be interpreted from the point of view of
making them adequate "for the general interests of the Union" and for
those purposes "to which the States are separately incompetent;"
2. That it was not intended that the supremacy which the Constitution
accords national legislation made in pursuance of the Constitution should
be qualified or limited by the powers of the states even with respect to
"matters of internal police" only. National-State relationship was at
first rested squarely upon the principle of national supremacy as thus
5. 2 FA AI-DR, coms oF THE FEDERAL CoNmNTION (1911) 21.
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conceived; and it has continued to rest there to this day within the field
of judicial power.
Turning to the Constitution itself, we find it directly incorporating
the states into the new national structure at vital points-conspicuously
in the choice of senators and of presidential electors. The feature of
the Constitution, however, which bears most directly on the question
here under investigation is its provision in Article VI, Paragraph 3,
that "the members of the several State legislatures and all executive
and judicial officers . . . of the States shall be bound by oath or
affirmation to support this Constitution."
Commenting upon this provrision in the Federalist No. 27, Hamilton
wrote:
"Thus the legislatures, courts and magistrates of the respective
members will be incorporated into the operations of the National
Government as far as its just and constitutional authority extends
and will be rendered auxiliary to the enforcement of its laws?'0
Indeed, the younger Pinckney had expressed the same idea on the floor
of the Philadelphia Convention:
"They (the States) are the instruments upon which the Union
must frequently depend for the force and execution of its powers."'
And substituting the word "may" for "must" in Pinckney's statement,
we find it to be amply justified by early Congressional legislation.
The Judiciary Act of 1789 left the state courts in sole possession of a
large part of the jurisdiction over controversies between citizens of
different states and in concurrent possession of the rest. What is more
important, it was provided by the famous Twenty-fifth Section of this
Act that a case "arising" under the Constitution and laws o'f the United
States which was first brought into a state court, should remain there
for final disposition unless the decision of the ighest state court into
which the case might under state law be brought, was adverse to the
party claiming under national authority, in which contingency there
should be an appeal on -writ of error to the Supreme Court of the
United States. By other sections of the same act state courts were
authorized to entertain proceedings by the United States itself to enforce
penalties and forfeitures under the revenue laws, while any justice of the
peace or other magistrafe of any of the states was authorized to cause
any offender against the United States to be arrested and imprisoned
6. THE F mEAL~sT (Lodge's Ed. 188S) 162. Madison speals to the same effect
in No. 44, id. at 284-5. See also Holcombe, The States as Agcnts of lh Nation,
(1921) 1 So .,F.srnw Pot.. ScL Q. 307.
7. 1 FA E=AD, op. dct. supra note 5, at 404.
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or bailed under the usual mode of process." Even as late as 1839, Con-
gress authorized all pecuniary penalties and forfeitures under the laws
of the United States to be sued for before any couirt of competent juris-
diction in the state where the cause of action arose or where the of-
fender might be found."
Pursuant also to the same idea of treating state governmental organs
as available to the National Government for administrative purposes, the
Act of 1793 entrusted the rendition of fugitive slaves in part to national
officials and in part to state officials, and the rendition of fugitives from
justice from one state to another exclusively to the state executives. 10
Certain later acts empowered state courts to entertain criminal prose-
cutions for forging paper of the Bank of the United States and for
counterfeiting coin of the United States;11 while still others conferred on
state judges authority to admit aliens to national citizenship and'provided
penalties in case such judges should utter false certificates of naturaliza-
tion-provisions which are still on the statute books.'
And from the first, treaties of the United States have thrown open
the state courts to aliens on the most-favored-nation basis and have in
other ways stipulated the active aid of state authorities in certain con-
tingencies, as in the interception and return of deserting alien seamen.
Indeed, the unity of the United States in the sphere of international
relationships is today an accepted feature of our dual system. In this
field the National Government is not a "foreign" government with re-
spect to the states, nor are the latter "sovereign" or "independent" with
respect to the former. And with the establishment of this principle the
relationship between the two is not normally one of competition, but
rather of cooperation and reciprocal service. The treaty-making au-
thority is the champion of the interests of the states, safeguarding their
local laws and customs, subject only to the proviso that these shall not,
in general, discriminate against aliens as such. On the other hand, it is
through these same local laws and authorities that the rights stipulated
for on behalf of aliens, in return for similar rights to American citizens
abroad, are rendered effective.13
8. 1 STAT. 73 (1789).
9. 5 STAT. 322 (1839).
10. 1 STAT. 302 (1793).
11. 2 STAT. 404 (1806). For the development of opinion, especially on the part of
the state courts, adverse to the validity of the above discussed legislation, see 1 IN.NT's
Co1mENTArEs (1826) *396-*404.
12. 2 KENT'S COammENTARmS (1826) *64--*65. 34 STAT. 596 (1906), 8 U. S. C.
§§357, 379 (1934) ; 34 STAT. 602 (1906), 18 U. S. C. § 135 (1934). For cases recognizing
the right of Congress to authorize naturalization proceedings in state courts, see Holngren
v. United States, 217 U. S. 509 (1910) and citations there given.
13. See generally MITCHELL, STATE INTEamSTS IN AmEmcAx TREATIEs (1936).
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Cooperation, nevertheless, between the two governmental centers, on
the basis of the supremacy of the National Government, came in time to
be challenged, and first of all in the area in which it was most extensively
employed in early legislation, namely, in the judicial field. The basis of
the challenge was furnished by the notion of the equal sovereignty of
the states and the National Government in their respective spheres. Quite
obviously this notion cannot be harmonized with the Supremacy Clause
of the Constitution 14 so long as the two spheres of jurisdiction overlap,
as they inevitably do when state organs are utilized for national purposes.
If, therefore, the principle of equal sovereignty was to make good, it
was incumbent upon its advocates to establish first the total independence
of the two governmental centers within their respective fields. The effort
initially took the form of an assault on the constitutionality of Section
25 of the Judiciary Act of 1789.
In the Philadelphia Convention the champions of States Rights had
urged that it was unnecessary to provide for an inferior federal judiciary.
It would be sufficient, they contended, if state courts were employed as
national courts of first instance, with a final appeal to the Supreme Court;
and the wording of Article III, Section 1, which provides that "the
judicial power of the United States shall be vested in one supreme court
and in such inferior courts as the Congress may from time to time ordain
and establish," represents a concession to this point of view.Y1 Indeed,
as late as 1802 the suggestion was broached that the entire inferior federal
judicial establishment ought to be abolished and its jurisdiction dis-
tributed between the state courts and the Supreme Court 1- an idea
which was effectively spiked when the latter held in Marbury v. Madi-
so' 7 that its original jurisdiction might not be enlarged by statute.
Yet ten years later the Virginia Court of Appeals, in Hunter v.
Martilt,'3 held the Twenty-fifth Section to be void on the ground that
it was not competent for Congress to authorize appeals from the courts
of another sovereignty, in this instance Virginia, to those of the United
States; and this argument was renewed in 1821 in Cohens v. Virgnia,0
where the Court, speaking by Chief Justice Marshall, disposed of it
in these terms:
14. U. S. CoNcsT. Art VI, par. 2.
15. See especially the proceedings of June 5th, 1 Fmtazm, op. cit. mipra note 5,
at 124-125. The New Jersey Plan reverted to the idea of using state courts as national
courts of first instance, with appeals to "a federal judiar".. to consist of a supreme
Tribunal, . . . " Id. at 244.
16. 1 ,VnAxr, Tun SuppmrE Coun n UnrMm StaTEs Hxs-oty (1922) 219-222.
17. 1 Cranch 137 (U. S. 1803).
18. 4 Munford 3 (Va. 1814) overturned in Martin v. Hunter's Lessee, 1 Wheat
304 (U. S. 1816).
19. 6 Wheat 264 (U. S. 1821).
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"It (the National Government) can, in effecting its objects,
legitimately control all individuals or governments in the American
territory. . . . The States are constituent parts of the United
States. They are parts of one great empire-for some purposes
sovereign, for some purposes subordinate." 20
Proceeding from this basis Marshall held the Twenty-fifth Section to
be a law "necessary and proper" to effectuate the judicial power of the
United States and hence within the legislative power of Congress.
And meantime, in the case of Houston v. Moore,2 the Court had
recognized a similar relationship as existing between the power of Con-
gress "to provide for calling forth the militia" and state executive power.
Here the legislation under review was an Act of Pennsylvania which
provided that the officers and privates of the militia of that state,
"neglecting or refusing to serve, when called into actual service, in pur-
suance of any order or requisition of the President of the United States,
shall be liable .to the penalties defined in the Act of Congress of the
28th of February, 1795, c. 277,22 or to any penalties which may have
been prescribed since the date of that act, or which may hereafter be
prescribed by any law of the United States."' 23 While the Act was sus-
tained by a divided Court the division was not over the question whether
Congress had the power which the Pennsylvania Act itself inferred,
but over the exclusiveness of this power. Also, it was conceded that
this power did not stop short of'the chief executive of the state. In
the words of Justice Johnson's concurring opinion:
"The doctrine must be admitted, that Congress might, if they
thought proper, have authorized the issuing of the President's order
even to the Governor. For when the. constitution of Pennsylvania
makes her Governor commander in chief of the militia, it must sub-
ject him in that capacity (at least when in actual service) to the orders
of him who is made commander in chief of all the militia of the
Union." 24
The Court first lent definite approval to the equal sovereignty theory
in Prigg v. Penusylvania,5 decided in 1842, in which the constitution-
ality of the provision of the Act of 1793, making it the duty of state
magistrates to aid in the return of fugitive slaves, was challenged.
Speaking for the Court, Justice Story said:
20. Id. at 414.
21. 5 Wheat. 1 (U. S. 1820).
22. 1 STAT. 424 (1795).
23. It is interesting to note that nobody seems to have commented on the delegation
of legislative power here involved.
24. 5 Wheat. 1, 40 (U. S. 1820).
25. 16 Pet. 539 (U. S. 1842).
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"The clause relating to fugitive slaves is found in the national Con-
stitution, and not in that of any state. It might well be deemed an
unconstitutional exercise of the power of interpretation, to insist that
the states are bound to provide means to carry into effect the duties
of the national government; nowhere delegated or intrusted to them
by the Constitution. On the contrary, the natural, if not the neces-
sary conclusion is, that the national government, in the absence of all.
positive provisions to the contrary, is bound through its ov proper
departments, legislative, executive, or judiciary, as the case may
require, to carry into effect all the rights and duties imposed upon
it by the Constitution. ' "
The Court, nevertheless, sustained the challenged provision in the sense
and to the extent "that State magistrates may, if they choose, exercise
the authority (conferred by the act) uhless prohibited by State legis-
lation."' In other words, the cooperation of the state in the enforce-
ment of the Act was purely voluntary, and the principle of national
supremacy did not apply.
And in Kentucky v. Dennison,2 8 decided on the eve of the Civil War,
the provisions of the same Act making it "the duty" of the chief executive
of a state to render up a fugitive from justice upon the demand of the
chief executive of the state from which the fugitive had fled, was given
a similar construction. Pertinently, Chief justice Taney remarked for
the Court:
"Looking to the subject-matter of this law, and the relations which
the United States and the several States bear to each other, the court
is of the opinion, the words 'it shall be the duty' were not used as
mandatory and compulsory, but as declaratory of the moral duty
which this compact created, when Congress had provided the mode
of carrying it into execution. The act does not provide any means
to compel the execution of this duty, nor inflict any punishment for
neglect or refusal on the part of the Executive of the State; nor is
there any clause or provision in the Constitution which arms the
Government of the United States with this power. Indeed, such a
power would place every State under the control and dominion of
the General Government, even in the administration of its internal
concerns and reserved rights. And we think it clear, that the Federal
Government, under the Constitution, has no power to impose on a
State officer, as such, any duty whatever, and compel him to perform
it; for if it possessed this power, it might overload the officer with
duties which would fill up all his time, and disable him from per-
forming his obligations to the State, and might impose on him duties
26. Id. at 541 (headnote), 615-616.
27. Id. at 542 (headnote), 622.
23. 24 How. 66 (U. S. 1861).
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of a character incompatible with the rank and dignity to which he
was elevated by the State."20
"It is true," the Chief Justice conceded, "that in the early days of the
Government, Congress relied with confidence upon the cooperation and
support of the States when exercising the legitimate powers of the
General Government, and were accustomed to receive it." But this, he
explained, was "upon principles of comity and from a sense of mutual
and common interest where no such duty was imposed by the Consti-
tution." 3
The holding, therefore, does not question the doctrine of the Prigg
case, that the National Government may invite the cooperation of the
executive agencies of the states in the enforcement of national laws, so
long as it leaves the state authorities, and ultimately the state legislatures,
free to decline the invitation. Nor does it disturb the principle of earlier
cases that state courts may be required, within their assigned jurisdiction,
to enforce rights claimable under the Constitution and laws of the United
States, whenever Congress chooses to employ them for the purpose.81
During the Civil War, President Lincoln repeatedly exercised his
military functions through the state governors, especially in the early
years of the var, but the cooperation accorded by the latter was regarded
as strictly voluntary. Said Attorney General Bates in an official opinion
dealing with the matter:
"The Governors of the loyal States have, both personally and
officially, rendered most valuable and effective service to the Nation-
al Government. . . But these labors are in aid of th6 Government
and with its approbation. They are performed not because it is a
legal duty imposed by Congress, or in many instances, even by their
respective States, but under the impulse of a generous humanity and
patriotism." 32
Not only does this language seem to traverse the doctrine of Houston& v.
Moore;33 it also contrasts sharply with assumptions which prevailed later
during the World War, when the Selective Service Act was enforced
almost entirely through state officials, who were held to strict account-
ability to national law.
Tendencies following the Civil War were, in fact, conflicting. In
Collector v. Day,34 decided in 1870, the Court, speaking by Justice Nelson,
29. Id. at 107-108.
30. Id. at 108.
31. See e.g., Claflin v. Houseman, 93 U. S. 130, 136, 137 (1876); Second Employers'
Liability Cases, 223 U. S. 1, 55-59 (1912).
32. OFFiciAL REcORDS OF THE UNION AND CONFEDEmAT AerEs, Ser. III, Vol. II,
151.
33. 5 Wheat. 1 (U. S. 1820).
34. 11 Wall. 113 (U. S. 1870).
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asserted that the principle of national supremacy did not operate in the
field of the "reserved powers" of the states- a doctrine which if
literally applied would go far to repeal the Supremacy Clause of the
Constitution. Actually the decision in the. case holds only that the
National Government may not tax state instrumentalities, a result which
could have been easily rested on the guaranty by the United States to
each state of a republican form of government.
Nine years later in the Siebold case,3 the Court sustained the right
of Congress under Article I, Section 4, Paragraph 1, of the Constitution,
to cast additional duties upon state election officials in connection with
a Congressional election and to prescribe additional penalties for the
violation by such officials of their duties under state law. While the
doctrine of the holding is expressly confined to cases in which the
National Government and the states enjoy "a concurrent power over
the same subject matter," no attempt is made to catalogue such cases.23
What is more, the outlook of justice Bradley's opinion for the Court
is decidedly nationalistic rather than dualistic, as is shown by the answer
made to the contention of counsel "that the nature of sovereignty is
such as to preclude the joint cooperation of two sovereigns, even in a
matter in -which they are mutually concerned." To this Justice Bradley
replied:
"As a general rule, it is no doubt expedient and wise that the
operations of the State and national governments should, as far as
practicable, be conducted separately, in order to avoid undue
jealousies and jars and conflicts of jurisdiction and power. But there
is no reason for laying this down as a rule of universal application.
It should never be made to override the plain and manifest dictates
of the Constitution itself. We cannot yield to such a transcendental
view of State sovereignty. The Constitution and laws of the United
States are the supreme law of the land, and to these every citizen of
every State owes obedience, whether in his individual or official
capacity."37
And he lat& added:
"We may mystify anything . . . If we allow ourselves to regard
it (the National Government) as a hostile organization, opposed to
the proper sovereignty and dignity of the State governments, we shall
continue to be vexed with difficulties as to its jurisdiction land au-
thorlity."38
35. 100 U. S. 371 (1879).
36. Id. at 384-386.
37. Id. at 392.
38. Id. at 393.
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Obviously, these words are much more in the spirit of Cohens v. Vir-
ginia than of Kentucky v. Dennison.
Thus, the framers of the Constitution did not regard it as incom-
patible with the nature of.our dual system that the National Govern-
ment should utilize the states as subordinate instruments of its powers.
Nor did the later contrary principle, of the equal dignity of the states
with the National Government, operate to displace the idea of the
availability of state powers for national purposes; -it only transferred
this idea to a new basis, that of state consent. Furthermore, the chief
result of the earlier principle for our constitutional system, the subor-
dination of the state judiciaries in the enforcement of the National Con-
stitution and laws, still remains unimpaired, while as to state executive
power it has been restored to an undefined extent. In short, the two
governmental centers may cooperate voluntarily in matters of common
interest without affront to our dual system. Such becomes even more
apparent from an examination of more recent legislation and adjudica-
tion.
2.
We come, therefore, to consider two forms of joint action by the
National Government and the states which have been developed within
recent decades and which call into exercise primarily the legislative powers
of the two governmental centers. The two forms of joint action referred
to are these: 1. The National Government has brought its powers over
interstate commerce and communications to the support of certain local
policies of the states in the exercise of their reserved powers; 2. The
National Government has held out inducements, primarily of a pecuniary
nature, to the states to use their reserved powers to support certain ob-
jectives of national policy in the field of expenditure. The same rationale
governs both types. On the one hand, there has been a growing recog-
nition of problems, demanding to be dealt with on a national scale; on
the other hand, there. has been reluctance to incur the dangers of cen-
tralization. So devices have been sought which will secure both' these
desiderata as far as practicable.
1. The outstanding reason for federal cooperation of the first type
arises from the principle that Congress' power over interstate commerce
and communication is ordinarily exclusive, from which it results, usual-
ly, that a state may not obstiuct the flow of commerce across its borders
from its sister states even when such flow threatens to undermine local
legislation."0 In consequence Congress has come, at different times, to
the aid. of the state police powers in the repression of lotteries,40 of
39. Many of the cases are collected in The Minnesota Rate Cases, 230 U. S. 352,
398-402 (1913).
40. 28 STAT. 963 (1895), 18 U. $. C. § 387 (1934).
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the liquor traffic,' of traffic in game taken in violation of state laws,-
of commerce in convict-made goods,4 3 of various criminal activities,44
and-though thus far ineffectively-of commerce in child-made goods.Y
The constitutionality of Congressional legislation stopping interstate
commerce in lottery tickets was finally established in 1903.0 Supple-
menting the state prohibition laws offered greater difficulty, inasmuch as
liquor was regarded by the Court as "a legitimate article of commerce,"
whereas lottery tickets were not. After a thirty-year struggle, however,
it was at last conceded that Congress could place liquor coming from
other states unrestrictedly under the laws of the state of destination.
This occurred in the case of the Clark Distilling Co. v. Western M].aryland
Railway,47 in which the Webb-Kenyon Act of 1913 was sustained.
Chief Justice White remolded the argument against the Act into "the
contradiction in terms that because Congress in adopting a regulation
lesser in power than it was authorized to exert, therefore, its action was
void for excess of power." He then went on:
"Or, in other words, stating .the necessary result of the argument
from a concrete consideration of the particular subject here involved,
that because Congress in adopting a regulation bad considered the
nature and character of our dual system of government, State and
Nation, and instead of absolutely prohibiting, had so conformed its
regulation as to produce cooperation between the local and national
forces of government to the end of preserving, the rights of all, it
had thereby transcended the complete and perfect power of regulation
conferred by the Constitution."
It is true that this statement of the issue did something less than
justice to the case against the Act, but that is a matter of minor im-
41. 26 STAT. 313 (1890), 27 U. S. C. § 121 (1934) ; 37 STAT. 699 (1913), 27 U. S. C.
§122 (1934).
42. 31 STAT. 188 (1900), 35 STA. 1137 (1909), 18 U.S.C. §392 (1934).
43. 45 STAT. 1034 (1929), 49 U.S. C. § 60 (1934).
44. The white slave traffic, 36 STAT. 825 (1910), IS U.S. C. § 399 (1934); traffic
in stolen motor vehicles, 41 STAT. 324 (1919), 18 U.S. C. § 403 (1934); kIdnaping,
47 STAT. 326 (1932), 18 U. S. C. § 40Sa (1934); stolen property, 43 STAT. 794, iS
U. S. C. § 415 (1934) ; racketeering, 48 STAT. 979, 18 U. S. C. § 420a (1934). The leading
cases are Hoke v. United States, 227 U. S. 303 (1913), sustaining the IVmn SLAVE
Acr; and Brooks v. United States, 267 U. S. 432 (1925), sustaining the Moron VrrE s
TnEzr AcT. In Gooch v. United States, 297 U. S. 124 (1936), the FEDmAL Km.DAn1m
Acr was broadly construed without comment on the constitutional question. For a survey
of the legislative proposals of 1934, many of which were subsequently enacted, see the
New York Times, May 24, 1934, p. 2, col. 2.
45. Hammer v. Dagenhart, 247 U. S. 251 (1918); Bailey v. Dlrexel Furniture
Company, 259 U. S. 20 (1922).
46. Champion v. Ames, 183 U. S. 321 (1903).
47. 242 U. S. 311 (1917).
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portance. The thing in which we are interested is the glimpse here af-
forded of the availability of the idea of National-State cooperation as a
way of retreat in certain instances from the difficulties created by" em-
barrassing precedents.
And meanwhile in sustaining, early in 1913, the Mann "White Slave"
Act,4 the Court had voiced the general conception of dual .federalism
upon which National-State cooperation rests, in these terms:
"Our dual form of government has its perplexities, State and
Nation having different spheres of jurisdiction . . . , but it must
be kept in mind that we are one people; and the powers reserved
to the States and those conferred on the Nation are adapted to be
exercised, whether independently or concurrently, to promote the
general welfare, material and moral." 40
And it is in reliance on this precedent that the National Government
has subsequently come to the assistance of the states in the suppression
of automobile thefts, of kidnaping, and of other criminal activities in-
volving the crossing of state lines, L-a somewhat 'striking development
when set alongside the original assumption of the Constitution that the
problem of the migratory offender would be dealt with by the process
of interstate extradition."' Nor, in fact, has the National Government
confined its assistance to the states in the discharge of their most primitive
function to the precincts of the legislation just alluded to. Notorious
offenders against state laws who had previously escaped punishment
were in many instances .proceeded against successfully under the National
Income Tax Act, the Alien Deportation Act, and the Anti-Trust Acts.
The Court, moreover, has distinctly countenanced National-State admin-
48. Hoke v. United States, 227 U. S. 308 (1913).
49. Id. at 322.
50. Note 44 mtpra.
51. U. S. CoNsT. Art. IV, § 2, par. 2.
52. This type of cooperation originated in joint national and state efforts to break
up bootlegging in Prohibition days. In this connection President Coolidge, on May
8, 1926, issued an order permitting the appointment of state and local officials as Federal
Prohibition officers. For the controversy over validity of this order, which terminated
in its vindication by the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, see New York Times,
May 22, 1926, p. 1, col. 8; id. May 25, 1926, p. 1, col. 6; id. May 26, 1926, p. 1, col. 8;
id. June 8, 1926, p. 1, col. 5. See also New York Times, Oct. 21, 1923, p. 1, col. 4,
for the Conference of Governors called by President Coolidge to consider national and
state cooperation in Prohibition enforcement. Nor has national-state cooperation in the
administrative field been confined to the criminal field. Thus President Hoover author-
ized the opening of federal income tax returns to the inspection of officials of states
with income tax laws. Under the Transportation Act of 1920, 41 STAT. 456 (1920),
49 U. S. C. §§ 71-74, 76-78, 141 (1934), cooperation between the Interstate Commerce
Commission and State Commissions has become an established practice.
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istrative cooperation in criminal law enforcement, even when proceeding
on no definite statutory basisY'3
Yet, when Congress undertook to prohibit'the transportation of child-
made goods from one state to another, in the aid presumably of states
maintaining a superior standard with reference to this subject, it was
held, in Hammer v. Dagenhart, to have exceeded its powers, and its
legislation was invalidated as an effort to coerce certain states "into com-
pliance with Congress's regulation of State concerns.'"' Thus the Court
deliberately placed itself in the same predicament in relation to anti-
child labor legislation as that from which it had so recently-and, as
it turned out, resultlessly--extricated itself in relation to anti-liquor legis-
lation. And once again it has had to beat a retreat from an untenable
position. The retreat is, to be sure, still under way, but who, wth the
results of the recent election in mind, can seriously doubt that it will be
carried out? The starting-point is Whitfield v. Ohio,"" decided last term,
where was sustained the Hawes-Cooper Act of January 29, 1929, which
prohibits the sale in the original package of convict-made goods entering
a state through the channels of foreign or interstate commerce.'; The
basis of the holding was a liquor case which was decided nearly half
a century ago, 57 and Hammer v. Dagenhart, on which the opponents of
the Act had relied, is not even mentioned in the Court's opinion! Even
more recently, the Court has upheld the validity of the Ashurst-Sumners
Act of July 24, 193 5, s which applies thWe principle of the WVebb-Kenyon
Act to convict-made goods.' Speaking for the unanimous Court, Chief
Justice Hughes said:
"The subject of the prohibited traffic is different, the effects of the
traffic are different, but the underlying principle is the same. Th5
pertinent point is that where the subject of commerce is one as to
which the power of the State may constitutionally be exerted by
restriction or prohibition in order to prevent harmful consequences,
the Congress may, if. it sees fit, put forth its power to regulate
interstate commerce so as to prevent that commerce from being
psed to impede the carrying out of the state policy . . . The Con-
gress in exercising the power confided to it by the Constitution is
as free as the States to recognize the fundamental interests of free
labor."
53. Ponzi v. Fessenden, 258 U. S. 254 (1922).
54. Hammer v. Dagenhart, 247 U. S. 251 (1918). The quoted w':ords are from
Chief Justice Taft's opinion in the Child Labor Tax Case of 1922, 259 U. S. 20, 39.
55. 297 U. S. 431 (1936).
56. 45 STAT. 1084 (1929), 49 U.S.C. §60 (1934).
57. In re Rahrer, 140 U. S. 545 (1891).
53. 49 STm. 494, 49 U. S. C. A. § 61 (Supp. 1935).
59. Kentucky Whip and Collar Co. v. Illinois Central PR. t., U. S. Sup. Ct. (1937)
4 U. S.L. Week 485.
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Can it be doubted that these words sound the doom of Hammer v. Dagen-
hart?
It may be contended, however, that there is a genuine difference, from
the point of view of concern for our dual system, between the act dis-
allowed in Hammer v. Dagenhart and an anti-child labor act modelled
on the Webb-Kenyon Act; that while the one was coercive of state
policies, the other would be cooperative with them. The contention derives
such plausibility as it possesses from the fact that the state policies
thought of are in the one instance those of producing states and in the
other instance those of consuming states. But Congress's purpose in
both cases is precisely the same, namely, to prevent a certain type of
goods from reaching the interstate market. In the one case, it relies on
its own unaided power, in the other it supplements certain legislation of
the consuming states; but in both instances the producing states are,
as such, "coerced." For what is the interstate market after all except
the sum total of the individual state markets for goods coming from
without?
On the other hand, we must not overlook the fact that the same bench
which decided the Whitfield Case6" also decided, practically contem-
poraneously, the Ashton Case," the Constantine Case,0 2 and the Carter
Case,6" in* all of which it professed to treat proffers of National co-
operation with state policies as coercive of the latter, and this in face of
vigorous protests in two of these cases, by the states most immediately
concerned, that they favored the condemned legislation.
4
What it all boils dowrl to is this: In the instances in which the Nation-
al Government has been sustaired in bringing its regulatory powers to
the aid of state policies, its right to do so has been ultirriately based by
the Court on the plenary nature of those powers as to the subject-matter
governed; and in such instances, as the Court has not hesitated to declare,
the National Government may with equal right traverse state policies.06
Yet even so, the final result was assisted, on one occasion at least, by
a judicial invocation of the idea of Natiorial-State cooperation, which
thus served to screen in some measure the Court's retreat from an un-
tenable position; and what is more, the same thing seems to be happen-
ing today all over again. In a word, permitted National-State cooperation
in a field of regulation is, it would seem, a half-way house to national
60. Whitfield v. Ohio, 297 U. S. 43 (1936).
61. Ashton v. Cameron Water Imp. Dist., 298 U. S. 513 (1936).
62. United States v. Constantine, 296 U. S. 287 (1935).
63. Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U. S. 238 (1936).
64. The Whitfield case was decided Mar. 2, 1936; the Carter case, May 18th;
the Ashton case, May 25th; the Constantine case, Dec. 9, 1935.
65. United States v. Hill, 248 U. S. 420, 425 (1919). And note the Chief Justice'd
further words in Kentucky Whip and Collar Co. v. Illinois Central R. R., U. S. Sup.




domination of the field, and little more. Is it of greater significance in
the field of national expenditure? The question brings us to the so-called
"Federal Grant-In-Aid."
2. The earliest precursor of the present "grant-in-aid" was the Act
under which, in 1802, Ohio was admitted to the Union. This measure
contained provisions whereby, in return for a grant of lands to each
township in the state for public schools, and other concessions, the state
pledged itself to withhold its harid in the matter of taxation for a term
of years as regards land sold by the National Government to settlers.
Later similar compacts were entered into with other states as they were
admitted into the Union.00
Building upon these beginnings, and animated especially by its in-
creasing interest in agricultural development, Congress in February, 1859
passed a bill the purpose of which was announced to be "the endowment,
support, and maintenance of at least one college (in each State) where
the leading object shall be, without excluding other scientific or classical
studies, to teach such branches of learning as are related to agriculture
and the mechanic arts, as the legislatures of the States may respectively
prescribe, in order to promote the liberal and practical education of the
industrial classes in the several pursuits alid professions of fife."" The
bill assigned to each state twenty thousand acres of land for each senator
and representative in the existing Congress and an additional tventy
thousand acres for each additional representative to which it might be-
come entitled under the census of 1860. In return each state was required
"to provide within five years at least not less than one college, or the
grant to said state," was to cease forthwith, and the state was to pay
over to the United States any amounts it had received from lands pre-
viously sold. Other conditions were also specified, and the consent of the
state must be communicated to the National Government within two
years. Although the bill was upset by Presidential veto, 6 the Mlorrill
Act embodying substantially the same provisions became law three years
later."9
But while grants-in-aid were made by Congress in exercise of its power
to "dispose" of the property of the United States,7° present-day Federal
grants-in-aid are of money appropriated from the revenues of the United
States, and hence call into requisition Congress's power to lay and collect
taxes and to spend the proceeds thereof for "the general welfare."
66. Corwin, The Spending Power of Congress (1923) 35 ELAnv. I. Rnv. 54S, 570.
On the power of Congress, when admitting a new state into the Union, to make such
compacts with it, see Stearns v. Minnesota, 179 U. S. 223, 244-20 (1900).
67. 5 RIcHImsoT, MEssAGEs AxD PApEpS OTr Tm P smmz;s (IS93) 543.
68. Id. at 547-548.
69. 12 STAT. 503 (1862), 7 U.S. C. §301 (1934).
70. U. S. Coxs. Art. IV, § 3, par. 2.
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A significant grant-in-aid of this character, matking a distinct advance
upon previous donations from the National Treasury, was the Act of
1911 whereby the Secretary of Agriculture was authorized:
"On such conditions as he deems wise, to stipulate and agree
with any State or group of States to cooperate in the organization
and maintenance of a system of fire protection on any private or
State forest lands within such State or States, and situated upon
the watershed of a navigable river. No such stipulation or agree-
ment shall be made with any State which has not provided by law
for a system of forest-fire protection. In no case shall the amount
expended in any State exceed in any fiscal year the amount appro-
priated by that State for the same purpose during the same fiscal
year." "
Thirteen years later the authorization was extended from timber to
cut-over lands and from watersheds of navigable streams to those from
which water for domestic use for irrigation was taken in the cooperating
states. Also the Secretary of Agriculture was:
"Authorized and directed, in cooperation with appropriate of-
ficials of the various States or, in his discretion, with other suitable
agencies, to assist the owners of farms in establishing, improving,
and renewing wood lots, shelter belts, windbreaks, and other valu-
able forest growth, and in growing and renewing useful timber crops.
Except for preliminary investigations, the amount expended by
the Federal Government under this section in cooperation with any
State or other cooperating agency during any fiscal year shall not
exceed the amount expended by the State or other cooperating
agency for the same purpose during the same fiscal year."72
By similar legislation since 1911 the National Government has under-
taken to subsidize agricultural extension work in the states, 73 the train-
ing of teachers in agriculture and industrial subjects and of home
economics,74 vocational rehabilitation and education,7r the maintenance
of nautical schools, 6 experiments in reforestation, 1 the construction of
highways,"8 the equipment and training of the National Guard,70 and other
71. 36 STAT. 961 (1911), 16 U.S.C. §563 (1934).
72. 43 STAT. 653 (1924), 16 U. S. C. §§564, 565 (1934).
73. 38 STAT. 372 (1914), 7 U. S. C. §§341-348 (1934).
74. 39 STAT. 929 (1917), 45 STAT. 1151 (1929), 48 STAT. 792 (1934), 20 U.S. C.§§ 11-15d (1934).
75. 41 STAT. 735 (1920), 43 STAT. 431 (1924), 46 STAT. 524 (1930), 47 STAT. 448
(1932), 29 U.S.C. §§31-38 (1934).
76. 36-STAT. 1353 (1911), 34 U. S. C. § 1122 (1934).
77. 45 STAT. 699 (1928), 16 U.S. C. §581 (1934).
78. TaE FEDERAL HIGRwAY AcT, 42 STAT. 212 (1921), 23 U. S. C. §§ 1-25 (1934).
79. TE NATioNAL DEFENSE AcT, 39 STAT. 197 (1916), 32 U.S. C. §§ 1-4 (1934).
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matters falling normally under the reserved powers of the states. Most
of the measures referred to stipulate for financial participation by the
cooperating states, usually on an equal basis, while some of them, the
Federal Highway Act and the National Defense Act in especial, subject
state policies and activities in the field of cooperation to national super-
vision in some detail. With, however, the exception of the National
Defense Act, none of these measures brings pressure to bear upon the
states to enter into cooperation with the National Government other
than the advantage to be anticipated from doing so. The National De-
fense Act is of a different character, since by virtue of Congress's power
to withhold consent to a state's maintaining "troops" in time of peace,
the states are virtually prohibited from keeping a militia except in ac-
cordance with the terms of this Act. 0
On the other hand, it should be noted, the cooperation which the grant-
in-aid brings about between the National Government and the states is
not merely a cooperation in expenditure. Even the consideration moving
from the National Government to the states is not exclusively pecuniary,
for the National Government, in laying down standards, supplies a guid-
ance for state policies which the states generally welcome, rather than.
accept with reluctance. Nor is the consideration which prompts the
National Government to initiate cooperative programs solely the financial
aid which the states will bring to such programs, but also the aid which
they can lend through their reserved powers. Thus federal highway con-
struction relies on the state power of eminent domain, as well as on state
power to police and protect highways during and after their construction.
Also, national protection of forests is supplemented by the power of the
states to regulate the conduct of persons entering forests; and the Shep-
pard-Towner Maternity Act was implemented by the power of the co-
operating states to compel birth registration, the licensing of mid-wives,
etc.
There is, in short, a real wedding of diverse powers on the part of the
two governmental centers. The greater financial strength of the National
Government is joined to the wider coercive powers of the states.
Various objections have been made to federal grants-in-aid, some of
which may bear, indirectly at least, upon the question of their constitu-
tionality.8' One is that they are financially oppressive to certain states,
especially to those which pay the larger share of the national income
tax. The argument ignores the fact that the vast proportion of the
income referred to is drawn from the country at large, and that so much
of it is paid from a certain few states simply because the takers thereof
-whether individuals or corporations-choose to reside or maintain
their headquarters in these states. The fact is, as was pointed out by
80. U. S. Coizis. Art 1, § 10; 39 STAT. 198 (1916), 32 U. S.C. § 192 (1934).
81. See .fAcDoxALD, FEnA. AiD (1928) c. X.
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the United States Treasury Department in 1922; "there is no way of
ascertaining from the income tax returns the amount of income earned
in the separate States or the amount of tax paid on that basis." On the
other hand, as the leading authority on-the subject has pointed out, if
we compare the amount of each state's wealth or its current income with
the amounts received by it. under federal grants-in-aid, the discrepancy
made so much of by certain critics is ordinarily very greatly reduced.82
A more serious charge against the grant-in-aid from the point of view
of concern for our dual system, is that it breaks down state initiative
and devitalizes state policies. The exact contrary appears to be the case.
For:
"State and county funds for extension work, vocational educa-
tion, highways-in fact, for every line of activity subsidized by the
federal government-have multiplied several fold as a direct result
of the stimulus of federal funds. Federal aid is often referred to
as the 'fifty-fifty' system, but it might more accurately be called
the 'eighty-twenty' or 'ninety-ten' system. Most of the money is
coming from local sources. The people in their local communities
are testifying to their interest most concretely by more than match-
ing federal funds. Often federal funds are matched several times
over. State and local expenditures for agricultural extension work
are nearly twice as large as the federal subsidy. For forest fire
prevention state and local funds are three times as large as the
federal grant. Every subsidy except that for the National Guard
is exceeded by local appropriations, and most of these local appro-
priations would never have been made, in the judgment of state
officials, without the stimulus of federal funds. The administration
of all these appropriations, federal and state alike, is in the hands of
state authorities. They are directly responsible for the framing
and execution of state policies. How, then, is it possible to justify
the assertion that local initiative is being stifled? When the records
show four or five states with satisfactory, well developed programs
of civilian rehabilitation or child hygiene in 1918 or 1920, and forty
or forty-five with such programs in 1927, controlled by state author-
ities and largely supported by state funds, it is difficult to believe
that local responsibility is being shirked, and that the people are
sitting back in complacent indifference." 33
Finally, it is charged that federal aid means the growth of an immense
bureaucracy in Washington, which in turn will threaten our dual system.
Granting, however, the inevitability of the 'increase in governmental
services in response to the needs of modern society, it would seem that
the federal grant-in-aid was well devised to obviate this very difficulty.
82. Id. at 248-250.
83. Id. at 255-256.
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On the basis of the grant-in-aid a most varied exchange of official ser-
vices has developed in recent years between the National Government
and the states, with the result that, while the usefulness of the state
administrative systems to their several localities has increased, the
National Civil Service had not, prior to the depression, been enlarged
to anything like the dimensions that it must have attained had the
National Government chosen to proceed alone in the field of National-
State cooperation."' For example, during the war with Germany, when
the National Government decided to seek state cooperation in the en-
forcement of the Selective Service Act, there were at one time more
than 192,000 persons "who functioned directly under State superiors,
while the office of the Provost-Marshal General-in charge of the Fed-
eral Operation of the Act had only 429 employees throughout the
States." This is an extreme instance, no doubt, but it serves to demon-
strate the effect of National-State cooperation in diffusing bureaucracy
in preference to concentrating it at the national capital.
The positive case for the grant-in-aid is that it has activated state
policies with respect to certain governmental services which modem con-
ditions make desirable from both a local and national point of view, and
has at the same time enabled certain states to avail themselves of im-
proved standards in the rendition of such services. Local government
has not been broken down, but has on the contrary been endowed with
increased usefulness, and therefore .with the increased prospects of sur-
vival which go with usefulness. On the other hand, the expanded
employment by the National Government of its power to make financial
provision for the "general welfare" has not resulted in a corresponding
expansion in national official personnel. All these advantages go to
stamp federal aid as a type of National-State relationship entirely har-
monious with the spirit of dual federalism, while they illustrate also
the continued capacity of the Constitution to adjust itself to modem
conditions.
The question remains whether federal grants-in-aid rim afoul of any
decisions of the Court. Two cases are directly in poinit: Massachusetts
84. See especially Clark, Joirt Acthity Belween Federal and State Officials (1936)
51 Po. Scr. Q. 230; also Frrz, Govaammiz Dv CoopmnATIOi (1932) c. III; also a series
of articles, Topical Survey of the Govenizent, which appeared in the United States Daily
during the summer and early autumn of 1928, each by an es-pert of some departmental
bureau of the National Government. Said .r. Hoover, when Secretary of Commerce:
"There is an . . . important field for cooperation by the Federal Government with
the multitude of agencies, State, Municipal, and private, in the systematic development
of those processes which directly affect public health, recreation, education, and the
home. We have need further to perfect the means by which government can be adapted
to human service," FiTE, mtpra, at 7. See also note 52, .rpra.
85. Clark, mipra note 84, at 243.
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v. Afelloit, 8 decided in 1923 and United States v. Butler,87 decided dur-
ing the past term. In the former the Court declined to enjoin, upon
the application of a state, the Secretary of the Treasury from paying
out certain sums which had been appropriated by Congress in the fur-
therance, it was contended, of "non-Federal purposes". In the words
of the Court:
"What, then, is the nature of the right of the State here asserted
and how is it affected by this statute? Reduced to its simplest terms,
it is alleged that the stitute constitutes an attempt to legislate out-
side the powers granted to Congress by the Constitution and within
the field of local powers exclusively reserved to the States. Nothing
is added to the force or effect of this assertion by the further in-
cidental allegations that the ulterior purpose of Congress thereby
was to induce the States to yield a portion of their sovereign rights;
that the burden of the appropriations falls unequally upon the several
States; and that there is imposed upon the States an illegal and
unconstitutional option either to yield to the Federal Government
a part of their reserved rights or lose their share of the moneys
appropriated. But what burden is imposed upon the States, un-
equally or otherwise? Certainly there is none, unless it be the
burden of taxation, and that falls upon their inhabitants, who are
within the taxing power of Congress as well as that of the States
where they reside. Nor does the statute require the States to do
or to yield anything. If Congress enacted it with the ulterior pur-
pose of tempting them to yield, that purpose may be effectiVely frus-
trated by the simple expedient of not yielding.
"In the last analysis, the complaint of the plaintiff State is brought
to the naked contention that Congress has usurped the reserved
powers of the several States by the mere enactment of the statute,
though nothing has been done and nothing is to be done without
their consent; and it is plain that that question, as it is thus pre-
sented, is political and not judicial in character, and therefore is
not a matter which admits of the exercise of the judicial power." 88
This language, it seems clear, goes beyond rejecting the application of
the state on the ground of its raising "a political question". It also meets
the contention that this type of legislation is coercive with respect to
the states, and rejects that contention.
The decision in United States v. Butler does "not in any wise impair
the authority of Massachusetts v. Mellon touching this matter. In the
later case it was held that certain payments to agriculture which were
86. 262 U. S. 447 (1923).
87. 297 U. S. 1 (1936).
88. 262 U. S. 447, 482-483 (1923).
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conditioned on the recipients' contractually agreeing to perform certain
acts not within the power of the National Government to compel, repre-
sented an effort by the National Government to regulate matters which
the Constitution had reserved to the states. The decision turned on the
proposition that the proposed beneficiaries of federal largess were not
free to reject it on account of the sharp competitive relation in which
they stood to each other. Clearly this line of reasoning in no wise dis-
turbs the statement in the M1'ellon case, with reference to a statute not
to be differentiated ". this respect from any grant-in-aid, that it did "not
require the States to do or yield anything." And in another respect,
United States v. Butler clearly improves the standing in Constitutional
law of the federal grant-in-aid, inasmuch as Justice Roberts took oc-
casion in his opinion to record the Court's acceptance of the Hamiltonian
theory of the scope of the spending power .of Congresss ZZ
And with these results before us, let us turn for a moment to the
S~cial Security Act, which marks the culmination to date of the federal
grant-in-aid. 0 In what terms ought the constitutional case for the
Act be formulated? The question is asked with special reference to
Titles III"x and IX,9 2 which have to do with unemployment compensa-
tion. The first and foremost task of the defenders of the Act is, ob-
viously, to show that the outlay of national funds which it authorizes
is for "the general welfare of the United States;" in light of the history
of public relief the last few years this ought to be a comparatively easy
task. And the remission of taxes provided for in Title IX is to be
justified in the same way, Florida v. lMellon 3 making this method of
purchasing state compliance equally eligible with the more conventional
method of an outright appropriation. Nex-t it should be shown that the
terms stipulated by the Act for state cooperation are designed to make
such cooperation better promotive of the main purpose of the Act and
are not intended to foist policies upon the cooperating states which are
not relevant to this purpose. Lastly, the argument should invoke the
89. See 297 U. S. 1, 65 (1936).
90. 49 STAr. 620, 42 U. S. C. §§ 301-1305 (Supp. 1935). The Act has already been
held constitutional in Davis v. Boston & 'Maine . RL, Mass., (1936) 4 U. S. L W=r
416 and by Judge David J. Davis in the federal district court for Alabama in dismissing
a suit by 200 Alabama concerns to enjoin collection of the tax le0ed by the Act.
N. Y. Times, Jan. 15, 1937, p. 7, col. 3. The Dazis case is norv on appeal and argument
has already been had before the Circuit Court of Appeals. N. Y. Times, Jan. 15, 1937.
p. 7, col. 4. For an extended discussion of the constitutionality of the Social Security
Act, see Shulman, Tire Case for the Conslitufionalifty of ili Social Security Act (1936)
3 LAW & Coxoran.. PFoB. 298; cf. Denby, The Case Against the Constihttionality of
the Social Security Act (1936) 3 LAw & Coz=rsEw. PRon. 315.
91. 49 Smr. 626, 42 U. S. C. §§ 501-503 (Supp. 1935).
92. 49 STAT. 639, 42 U. S. C. §§ 1101-1110 (Supp. 1935).
93. 273 U. S. 12 (1927).
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right of the states to set up a system of unemployment compensation. 4
Cooperating with the states in implementing this right, the National
,Government is relieved from the necessity of vindicating, in face of the
hostile dicta of the A. A. A.95 and Alton" cases, its own independent
right to do the same thing.
National-State cooperation has rested successively on the principle of
national supremacy and that of voluntary cooperation on the part of the
states constitutionally equipped to cooperate. The participation of the
state courts in certain portions of the jurisdiction which is described in
Article III, Section 2 of the Constitution still testifies to the effective-
ness of the earlier type of cooperation. But there are also cases in good
standing that hold that the state executive power too may be at times
laid under requisition by the National Government. Nevertheless, the
very extensive joint activity between national and state officialdom which
has grown up within recent decades rests almost exclusively on the prin-
ciple of voluntary cooperation. 7
Cooperation between the National Government and the states in the
legislative field rests, likewise, upon the voluntary principle-in the main,
can rest on no other. Such cooperation takes two forms: first, the
national legislative power, particularly that over commerce and com-
munications, is exerted in aid of state policies; secondly, the national
power to tax and spend is used to. provide financial inducements to the
states to exert their reserved powers in the furtherance of the legitimate
objectives of national expenditure. The validity of the former type of
cooperation is dependent upon the Court's recognition of the national
legislative power which is exerted as being one which is not conditioned
by the reserved powers of the states. The validity of the latter depends
on the Court's conception of "the general welfare of the United States,"
as that term is used in the first clause of Article I, Section 8 of the
Constitution.
94. See Associated Industries of New York State, Inc. v. Department of Labor of
State of New York, 57 Sup. Ct. 122 (1936) wherein an equally divided court affirmed
the New York Court of Appeals which had upheld the constitutionality of the New York
Unemployment Insurance Act, [271 N.Y. 1, 2 N.E. (2d) 22 (1936)]. See also Gillum
v. Johnson, Cal. Sup. Ct., (1936) 4 U. S. L. WF 419, and Haines Brothers Co. v.
Unemployment Compensation Commission, Mass. Sup. Jud. Ct., (1936) upholding the
constitutionality of the California Unemployment Reserves Act and the Massachusetts
Unemployment Compensation Law respectively. But cf. Gulf States Paper Corp. v.
Carmichael, N. D. Ala., (1936) 4 U. S. L. W=mc 450 in which a three judge federal
court held the Alabama Unemployment Compensation Law unconstitutional.
95. United States v. Butler, 297 U. S. 1 (1936).
96. Railroad Retirement Board v. Alton R. R., 295 U. S. 330 (1935).
97. See Clark, loc. cit. supra note 84.
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It is this last type of National-State cooperation, effected by means
of the federal grant-in-aid, which best realizes the ideal of Cooperative
Federalism. By this device there is brought about a real mergence of
powers and a real reciprocity of service for common ends, on the part
of the two governmental centers. But the other type, too, has its value
at the present moment in enabling the Court to beat a retreat from its
recent out-of-date positions regarding national power, with a minimum
loss of face.
